Voting as Communicating

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00126zbMATH Open0956.91033OpenAlexW2104192060MaRDI QIDQ4949580FDOQ4949580

Authors: Thomas Piketty 

Publication date: 9 March 2001

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00126

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zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyelectoral systemsvotingmultiple-round systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (17)

• A theory of strategic voting with non-instrumental motives
• A signaling model of repeated elections
• Information aggregation with runoff voting
• Pandering and electoral competition
• Voting as a signaling device
• Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
• Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
• Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
• Pivots versus signals in elections
• Majority rule when voters like to win
• Vote or Shout
• Information transmission and voting
• Communication compatible voting rules
• Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
• The expressive power of voting rules
• Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory
• Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse

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