scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3847166
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0519.00015.] A number of voting systems for multicandidate elections stipulate that the voter may, under certain constraints, cast \(v_ i\geq 0\) votes for the i-th candidate, \(i=1,..,K\) (where K is the number of candidates), and that the candidate receiving the greatest total vote wins. We will refer to these methods as numerical voting systems. Each can be characterized by the constraints imposed: e.g., simple plurality voting permits one of the \(v_ i\) to be 1 but the others must be 0; approval voting permits each of the \(v_ i\) to be either 0 or 1; the Borda system requires that the set \(\{v_ i: i=1,...,K\}\) consist of the numbers K-1, K-2,...,0; cardinal measure voting requires that \(0\leq v_ i\leq M\) for some fixed positive number M. We will address the question: Given a particular voting system, how might the voter choose the \(v_ i\) in order to maximize his influence or power on the outcome of the election? Our approach will fall under the heading of decision analysis; in particular we will investigate the optimal decision or strategy for the voter under uncertainty and under risk, i.e., under different assumptions concerning the voter's knowledge of the likely outcome of the election.
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