Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_12zbMATH Open1348.91106OpenAlexW32875052MaRDI QIDQ2829685FDOQ2829685

Aki Lehtinen

Publication date: 8 November 2016

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_12

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
• Analyzing a nail-biting election
• A Model for Strategic Voting
• Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players
• Approval Voting: A 'Best Buy' Method for Multi-Candidate Elections?

Cited In (1)

• Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting

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