Behavioral heterogeneity under approval and plurality voting

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_12MaRDI QIDQ2829685zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aki Lehtinen

Publication date 8 November 2016

Published in Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_12

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
• Making statements and approval voting
• Strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3847166 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 193519 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Model for Strategic Voting
• Analyzing a nail-biting election
• Approval Voting: A 'Best Buy' Method for Multi-Candidate Elections?
• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
• Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas

Cited in

(1)

• Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting

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