Behavioral heterogeneity under approval and plurality voting
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Publication:2829685
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3847166 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 193519 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Model for Strategic Voting
- Analyzing a nail-biting election
- Approval Voting: A 'Best Buy' Method for Multi-Candidate Elections?
- Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
- Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players
- The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
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