Strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting

DOI10.1007/BF00179095MaRDI QIDQ1906012zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yunfeng Luo, Chaoyuan Yue, Ting Chen

Publication date 6 February 1996

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00179095

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingsinceritystrategy stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

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• Fully sincere voting
• Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example
• Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
• Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
• A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Behavioral heterogeneity under approval and plurality voting
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 991573 (Why is no real title available?)
• Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
• Bargaining through approval
• Approval voting on dichotomous preferences

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