Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example
The author presents a historic reconstruction of the single-member constituency election system known as approval voting which was used to elect Venetian dogi for over 500 years. An interesting procedure theoretically, concurrent approval voting is the only sincere single- winner election system. Central issues concerning strategy choice under uncertainty are investigated using a contingency-dependent framework of individual behavior given prior probability distributions over decision relevant propositions. Extensions are then proposed for the use of approval procedures in modern elections and other collective decision- making situations. Finally the advantages of trichotomous preferences in decision and strategy analysis are argued.
- Ramon Llull: from `Ars electionis' to social choice theory
- Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
- Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
- Voting in the Medieval Papacy and Religious Orders
- Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- Decomposing random mechanisms
This page was built for publication: Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1072419)
