Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example

DOI10.1007/BF00135090MaRDI QIDQ1072419zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Marji Lines

Publication date 1986

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00135090

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingcollective decision-makinghistoric reconstructionsincere single-winner election systemsingle-member constituency election systemtrichotomous preferencesVenetian dogi

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
• Social choice and individual values

Cited in

(7)

• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
• Decomposing random mechanisms
• Voting procedures, complexity of
• Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank
• Voting in the Medieval Papacy and Religious Orders
• Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
• Ramon Llull: from `Ars electionis' to social choice theory

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