Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_3MaRDI QIDQ2829676zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Steven J. Brams, Peter Fishburn

Publication date 8 November 2016

Published in Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• A nail-biting election
• Analysing a preference and approval profile
• Analyzing a nail-biting election
• Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example
• Approval voting, Borda winners, and Condorcet winners: evidence from seven elections
• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting

Cited in

(7)

• On the complexity of winner determination and strategic control in conditional approval voting
• Two field experiments on approval voting in Germany
• Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting
• Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting
• Approval voting with endogenous candidates
• Approval voting: three examples
• Decentralized update selection with semi-strategic experts

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