Analyzing a nail-biting election

DOI10.1007/S003550100136MaRDI QIDQ2388808zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald G. Saari

Publication date 20 September 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100136

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(15)

• Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice
• On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data
• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
• Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities
• A live experiment on approval voting
• Majority judgment vs. majority rule
• Systematic analysis of multiple voting rules
• Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
• Behavioral heterogeneity under approval and plurality voting
• Describing society through approval data
• A comparison of some distance-based choice rules in ranking environments
• Approval voting with endogenous candidates
• Majority judgment vs. approval voting
• A geometric model of sensitivity of multistage elections to change
• Complexity and the geometry of voting

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