Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections
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Publication:2300612
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Cites work
- A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Counting Integral Points in Polyhedra When the Dimension is Fixed
- Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
- Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections
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- Condorcet’s Paradox
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Cited in
(14)- The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
- Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
- On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections
- Analyzing a nail-biting election
- Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities
- Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 804221 (Why is no real title available?)
- Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality
- Polytope volume by descent in the face lattice and applications in social choice
- Probabilities of election outcomes with two parameters: the relative impact of unifying and polarizing candidates
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