Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
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Publication:2452242
DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0667-1zbMATH Open1288.91076arXiv1109.1545OpenAlexW2091420732MaRDI QIDQ2452242FDOQ2452242
Authors: Achill Schürmann 
Publication date: 2 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: A large amount of literature in social choice theory deals with quantifying the probability of certain election outcomes. One way of computing the probability of a specific voting situation under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption is via counting integral points in polyhedra. Here, Ehrhart theory can help, but unfortunately the dimension and complexity of the involved polyhedra grows rapidly with the number of candidates. However, if we exploit available polyhedral symmetries, some computations become possible that previously were infeasible. We show this in three well known examples: Condorcet's paradox, Condorcet efficiency of plurality voting and in Plurality voting vs Plurality Runoff.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.1545
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Polyhedral combinatorics, branch-and-bound, branch-and-cut (90C57) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)
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Cited In (20)
- Exploiting symmetries in polyhedral computations
- Polytope volume by descent in the face lattice and applications in social choice
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- Polytope volume in Normaliz
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- How to compute the Stanley depth of a module
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- The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting
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- An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
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- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- The computation of generalized Ehrhart series in normaliz
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- On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
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