Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
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Publication:2567927
DOI10.1007/s003550100127zbMath1072.91530OpenAlexW1977524256MaRDI QIDQ2567927
Publication date: 14 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100127
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