Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0920-5MaRDI QIDQ2629520zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley, Florenz Plassmann

Publication date 6 July 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0920-5

zbMATH Keywords

votingelectioncandidate ranking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
• Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082116
• The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• A comparison of theoretical and empirical evaluations of the Borda compromise
• Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
• Condorcet’s Paradox
• Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice
• Millions of election outcomes from a single profile
• Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• Probabilities of election outcomes with two parameters: the relative impact of unifying and polarizing candidates
• The Borda dictionary
• The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
• Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

Cited in

(6)

• Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions
• The impact of forcing preference rankings when indifference exists
• When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality
• Asymptotic efficiency of majority rule relative to rank-sum method for selecting the best population
• IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
• Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?

This page was built for publication: Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2629520)