Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice
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Publication:2436696
DOI10.1007/s10472-013-9360-zzbMath1284.91132MaRDI QIDQ2436696
T. Nicolaus Tideman, Florenz Plassmann
Publication date: 25 February 2014
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-013-9360-z
62P20: Applications of statistics to economics
91B12: Voting theory
91B72: Spatial models in economics
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