Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences

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Publication:1863926

DOI10.1023/A:1015551010381zbMath1030.91500MaRDI QIDQ1863926

William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 12 March 2003

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)




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