The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas

DOI10.1007/S11238-007-9028-4MaRDI QIDQ995675zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Aki Lehtinen

Publication date 10 September 2007

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9028-4

zbMATH Keywords

simulationstrategic votingwelfareagendascounterbalancing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3823440 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4183141 (Why is no real title available?)
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Alternative Conditions for Social Orderings
• Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• How relevant are irrelevant alternatives?
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players
• Social choice and individual values
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles
• The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games

Cited in

(6)

• Condorcet meets Bentham
• Voting originated social dynamics: quartile analysis of stochastic environment peculiarities
• Behavioral heterogeneity under approval and plurality voting
• Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing
• An experimental study of voting with costly delay
• The epistemic benefits of generalisation in modelling. I: Systems and applicability

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