The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
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Publication:995675
DOI10.1007/S11238-007-9028-4zbMATH Open1161.91350OpenAlexW1965366519WikidataQ56081059 ScholiaQ56081059MaRDI QIDQ995675FDOQ995675
Authors: Aki Lehtinen 
Publication date: 10 September 2007
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9028-4
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Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- How relevant are irrelevant alternatives?
- A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
- Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences
- The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games
- The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles
- Alternative Conditions for Social Orderings
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- Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players
Cited In (6)
- Voting originated social dynamics: quartile analysis of stochastic environment peculiarities
- Behavioral heterogeneity under approval and plurality voting
- The epistemic benefits of generalisation in modelling. I: Systems and applicability
- Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing
- An experimental study of voting with costly delay
- Condorcet meets Bentham
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