The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1993.1008zbMATH Open0770.90091OpenAlexW2004372975MaRDI QIDQ1207830FDOQ1207830

Authors: Birgitte Sloth 

Publication date: 16 May 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1008

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zbMATH Keywords

large sequential decision gamesvoting situations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (22)

• The difference model of voting
• One dynamic problem in voting theory. II
• Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
• Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games
• Nash equilibrium in multiparty competition with ``stochastic voters
• The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections
• A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
• Negotiable votes
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable
• Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.
• The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
• When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
• Representative voting games
• On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
• Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
• A lemma in open sequential voting by veto
• Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
• Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
• The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections

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