A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
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\textit{J. Greenberg}'s result [Econometrica 47, 627-636 (1979; Zbl 0423.90007)] on the non-emptiness of the core of a majority game in \({\mathbb{R}}^ m\) is generalized to arbitrary voting games. More recently \textit{J. Greenberg} and \textit{Sh. Weber} [Int. J. Game Theory 13, 65-68 (1984; Zbl 0537.90004)] have shown that the majority game is balanced. In this paper, the author shows that this result cannot be generalized to arbitrary voting games.
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Cites work
- Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium
- Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- On Milnor's classes L and D
- On the core of voting games
- Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
- The Core of an N Person Game
- The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
Cited in
(10)- A note on the corelessness or antibalance of a game
- On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games
- On balanced games and games with committee control
- A non-weakly balanced game with non-empty bargaining set
- A note on the core of voting games
- On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games
- Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
- The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games
- On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval
- Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium
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