On the core of voting games
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Recommendations
- Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
- On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games
- A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games
- A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games
- A note on the core of voting games
Cites work
- A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
- Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- Generic Instability of Majority Rule
- Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
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- Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
- On the Continuous Representation of Preorders
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
- Saturation Locale et Concepts Primitifs de la Theorie du Consommateur
- Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
Cited in
(32)- Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
- On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games
- The uncovered set in spatial voting games
- Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
- A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
- The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games
- Stability of voting games
- Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
- Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
- A note on the core of voting games
- Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
- Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
- Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- Voter turnout as a participation game: An experimental investigation
- The Condorcet paradox revisited
- Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
- Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
- Reliability Weighted Voting Games
- Fuzzy Black's median voter theorem: examining the structure of fuzzy rules and strict preference
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- The core of voting games: a partition approach
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- Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
- A core of voting games with improved foresight
- Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
- The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
- Simple games with many effective voters
- Endogenous voting agendas
- Repeated Downsian electoral competition
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