A core of voting games with improved foresight
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set
- A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
- Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES
- Quota games and stability set of order \(d\)
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Stability of voting games
- Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
- The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
- The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
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