Quota games and stability set of order \(d\)

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00040-8zbMath1284.91033OpenAlexW2087359999MaRDI QIDQ2442563

Mathieu Martin

Publication date: 3 April 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00040-8

zbMATH Keywords

corequota gamesstability set of order \(d\)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (5)

Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets ⋮ Bounds for the Nakamura number ⋮ A core of voting games with improved foresight ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS ⋮ The stability set as a social choice correspondence.

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Stability of voting games
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Consistent Voting Systems

This page was built for publication: Quota games and stability set of order \(d\)