A core of voting games with improved foresight
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Publication:732925
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.04.003zbMath1193.91046MaRDI QIDQ732925
Bertrand Tchantcho, Joël Moulen, Lawrence Diffo Lambo
Publication date: 15 October 2009
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.04.003
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Cites Work
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