A core of voting games with improved foresight

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.04.003zbMath1193.91046MaRDI QIDQ732925

Bertrand Tchantcho, Joël Moulen, Lawrence Diffo Lambo

Publication date: 15 October 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

stability set; core; no-regret property; voting games; foresighted core; P-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B12: Voting theory

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Cites Work

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