Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games

DOI10.1287/MOOR.1.1.43zbMATH Open0457.90095OpenAlexW2148503166MaRDI QIDQ3907448FDOQ3907448

Authors: Alvin E. Roth 

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/286eb22f816ee60353ef0cc74c68ef75831d0921

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesgeneralizationstable setssubsolutionsabstract gamesvon Neumann- Morgenstern solutionsupercore

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (33)

• Stable sets in majority pillage games
• A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets
• Two-person games on graphs
• Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
• Absorbing sets in roommate problems
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• An extension and simple proof of a constrained lattice fixed point theorem
• Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• Choice procedure in fuzzy multicriteria decision analysis based on pairwise comparisons
• General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments
• Information market games
• Bayesian coalitional rationalizability
• The supercore for normal-form games
• A core of voting games with improved foresight
• Fuzzy sets and decision analysis
• On fuzzification of some concepts of graphs
• Order-reversing maps and unique fixed points in complete lattices
• Fair stable sets of simple games
• A dynamic solution concept for abstract games
• Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system
• Clan games
• Pillage and property
• A characterization of path dependent modes of behavior
• Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
• The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games
• Spatial pillage game
• A lattice fixed-point theorem with constraints
• An absorbing set for cooperative games
• Generalized solution principles and outranking relations in multi- criteria decision-making
• On Kernels of Graphs and Solutions of Games: A Synopsis Based on Relations and Fixpoints
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games

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