Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games

DOI10.1287/moor.1.1.43zbMath0457.90095OpenAlexW2148503166MaRDI QIDQ3907448

Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/286eb22f816ee60353ef0cc74c68ef75831d0921

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesgeneralizationstable setssubsolutionsabstract gamesvon Neumann- Morgenstern solutionsupercore

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20)

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