A dynamic solution concept for abstract games
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Publication:754782
DOI10.1007/BF00934721zbMath0416.90088OpenAlexW2005233520MaRDI QIDQ754782
Publication date: 1980
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00934721
Related Items (13)
Cooperation with externalities and uncertainty ⋮ On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach ⋮ Families of abstract decision problems whose admissible sets intersect in a singleton ⋮ Absorbing sets in roommate problems ⋮ A general characterization for non-balanced games in terms of \(U\)-cycles ⋮ The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ On the solution of \(w\)-stable sets ⋮ The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement ⋮ Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes ⋮ Models of coalition or alliance formation ⋮ On coalition formation in simple games: A mathematical analysis of Caplow's and Gamson's theories ⋮ Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
Cites Work
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- Games with unique solutions that are nonconvex
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- Communications to the Editor—A Counterexample in Game Theory
- A game with no solution
- The Proof That a Game May Not Have a Solution
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