A dynamic solution concept for abstract games
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Publication:754782
DOI10.1007/BF00934721zbMATH Open0416.90088OpenAlexW2005233520MaRDI QIDQ754782FDOQ754782
Authors: Prakash P. Shenoy 
Publication date: 1980
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00934721
Cites Work
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- An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
- Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
- A game with no solution
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- Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
- Games with unique solutions that are nonconvex
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- Communications to the Editor—A Counterexample in Game Theory
Cited In (14)
- On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
- Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- On coalition formation in simple games: A mathematical analysis of Caplow's and Gamson's theories
- The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement
- Models of coalition or alliance formation
- A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Cooperation with externalities and uncertainty
- The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
- On the solution of \(w\)-stable sets
- Networks and stability
- A general characterization for non-balanced games in terms of \(U\)-cycles
- Families of abstract decision problems whose admissible sets intersect in a singleton
- Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes
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