A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1600673 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- A dynamic solution concept for abstract games
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- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
- Choosing from a tournament
- Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
- Connectivity in digraphs
- Consequences of reversing preferences
- Extending tournament solutions
- Families of abstract decision problems whose admissible sets intersect in a singleton
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- On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
- On the solution of \(w\)-stable sets
- Possible and necessary winners of partial tournaments
- Stable sets and standards of behaviour
- The Copeland choice function. An axiomatic characterization
- The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
- The Copeland rule and Condorcet's principle
- The flow network method
- Tournament solutions
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- Uncovered sets
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