The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2021.04.009MaRDI QIDQ2243513zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Weibin Han, Adrian Van Deemen

Publication date 11 November 2021

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

generalized stable setstable setuncovered setunsurpassed set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Set theory (03E99) Decision theory (91B06)

Review text

The authors review results on the solution of generalized stable sets for abstract decision problems, in the case of irreflexive but not necessarily asymmetric or complete dominance relations. Although the fundamental properties of this solution are preserved for this kind of dominance relations, they may contain Pareto-suboptimal alternatives when the dominance relation is derived from pairwise majority comparison, and may fail to discriminate among the alternatives under consideration when the dominance relation is a Hamilton cycle, i.e., a cycle that includes all alternatives. A refinement of generalized stable sets is proposed in order to address these shortcomings, in which case the undisturbed generalized stable sets are Pareto optimal and have discriminating power in the case of Hamilton cycles. Moreover, this refinement is always a subset of the solutions of the uncovered set and of the unsurpassed set. This implies that undisturbed generalized stable set also may be seen as a refinement of both the uncovered set and the unsurpassed set

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Cited in

(5)

• More on the stable, generalized stable, absorbing and admissible sets
• Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations
• Applications of the Inverse Theta Number in Stable Set Problems
• On the solution of \(w\)-stable sets
• A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value

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