Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations

DOI10.1134/S0005117910010091zbMATH Open1186.93004OpenAlexW2048843901MaRDI QIDQ2269381FDOQ2269381

Authors: A. N. Subochev 

Publication date: 16 March 2010

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117910010091

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zbMATH Keywords

collective preference systemminimal dominating, uncovered, and minimal weakly stable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Decentralized systems (93A14) Applications of graph theory to circuits and networks (94C15)

Cites Work

• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets

Cited In (7)

• On the construction of non-empty choice sets
• The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement
• Minimal covering set solutions
• Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications
• Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
• Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution
• On the structure of stable tournament solutions

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