Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations

DOI10.1134/S0005117910010091MaRDI QIDQ2269381zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors A. N. Subochev

Publication date 16 March 2010

Published in Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117910010091

zbMATH Keywords

collective preference systemminimal dominating, uncovered, and minimal weakly stable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Decentralized systems (93A14) Applications of graph theory to circuits and networks (94C15)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
• A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions

Cited in

(7)

• On the construction of non-empty choice sets
• The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement
• Minimal covering set solutions
• Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications
• Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
• Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution
• On the structure of stable tournament solutions

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