Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule

DOI10.1007/s10898-012-9907-2zbMath1277.91046OpenAlexW2032692694MaRDI QIDQ2392761

Andrey Subochev, Fuad T. Aleskerov

Publication date: 2 August 2013

Published in: Journal of Global Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-012-9907-2

zbMATH Keywords

stable setcoretournamentsCondorcet winneruncovered setsolution concepttop cycleweakly stable setmajority relationexternally stable setmatrix-vector representationuncaptured setuntrapped set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations
• Uncovered sets
• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate

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