Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
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Publication:2392761
DOI10.1007/s10898-012-9907-2zbMath1277.91046OpenAlexW2032692694MaRDI QIDQ2392761
Andrey Subochev, Fuad T. Aleskerov
Publication date: 2 August 2013
Published in: Journal of Global Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-012-9907-2
stable setcoretournamentsCondorcet winneruncovered setsolution concepttop cycleweakly stable setmajority relationexternally stable setmatrix-vector representationuncaptured setuntrapped set
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