Weak covering relations
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Publication:1342391
DOI10.1007/BF01079911zbMath0815.90005OpenAlexW1966415899MaRDI QIDQ1342391
Publication date: 27 June 1995
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01079911
Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08) Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items
Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule, Representation in majority tournaments, Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
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