The uncovered set in spatial voting games

DOI10.1007/BF00126302zbMath0636.90105OpenAlexW2015820880MaRDI QIDQ1098794

Nicholas Noviello, Richard Hartly, Scott L. Feld, Bernard Grofman, Nicholas R. Miller, Marc D. Kilgour

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00126302

zbMATH Keywords

uncovered setBanks setspatial voting gamesmajority rule voting gameSchattschneider set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Generalized medians and a political center ⋮ Weak covering relations ⋮ The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model ⋮ Voting in one's head as a source of nearly transitive individual preferences over multi-dimensional issues ⋮ In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games ⋮ On the uniqueness of the yolk ⋮ A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension ⋮ Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model ⋮ The almost surely shrinking yolk ⋮ The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees ⋮ A theorem connecting Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two dimensions ⋮ The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems ⋮ Formal versus informal legislative bargaining

Cites Work

• Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• A Stochastic Solution Concept for n-Person Games
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule