Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
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Publication:263365
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.004zbMath1347.91045OpenAlexW2250308477MaRDI QIDQ263365
Roald Ramer, Arthur Schram, Adrian de Groot Ruiz
Publication date: 5 April 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/45227
experimentpolarizationcoreformal bargaininginformal bargaininglegislative bargainingmedian voteruncovered set
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)
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Cites Work
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