Formal versus informal legislative bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.004MaRDI QIDQ263365zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Adrian de Groot Ruiz, Roald Ramer, Arthur Schram

Publication date 5 April 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1814/45227

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcorepolarizationformal bargaininginformal bargaininglegislative bargainingmedian voteruncovered set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
• Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
• A bargaining model of endogenous procedures

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study
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Cited in

(6)

• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
• Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study
• Demand bargaining in legislatures
• A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time
• Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining

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