Formal versus informal legislative bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.004zbMATH Open1347.91045OpenAlexW2250308477MaRDI QIDQ263365FDOQ263365

Roald Ramer, Arthur Schram, Adrian de Groot Ruiz

Publication date: 5 April 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/45227

Recommendations

• Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
• Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
• A bargaining model of endogenous procedures

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcorepolarizationformal bargaininginformal bargaininglegislative bargainingmedian voteruncovered set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• On the core of voting games
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Strategy and equity: An ERC-analysis of the Güth-van Damme game
• Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study
• The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules
• A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
• Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
• How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• A Structural Model of Government Formation
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence

Cited In (4)

• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study
• A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time
• Demand bargaining in legislatures

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

This page was built for publication: Formal versus informal legislative bargaining

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q263365)