How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation
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Publication:3114843
DOI10.1287/mnsc.49.5.583.15148zbMath1232.91276OpenAlexW2012669755MaRDI QIDQ3114843
Kalyan Chatterjee, Kathleen McGinn, Gary E. Bolton
Publication date: 19 February 2012
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7a07b4ecacb5eb31247c7a62304b040393779d72
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)
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