The influence of face-to-face communication: a principal-agent experiment
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Cites work
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- How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation
- How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Trust, reciprocity, and social history
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(5)- Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment
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- Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
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