The influence of face-to-face communication: a principal-agent experiment
From MaRDI portal
Publication:301155
DOI10.1007/S10100-012-0270-7zbMATH Open1339.91078OpenAlexW1964371012MaRDI QIDQ301155FDOQ301155
Authors: Arleta Rasmußen
Publication date: 29 June 2016
Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-012-0270-7
Recommendations
- Bonus or flat wage? An experiment into the principal-agent problem
- Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment
- The principal-agent problem with adaptive players
- An experimental investigation of the `tenuous trade-off' between risk and incentives in organizations
- Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences: an experimental study
Cites Work
- How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Trust, reciprocity, and social history
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- Bonus or flat wage? An experiment into the principal-agent problem
- How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games
Cited In (4)
- Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
- The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners. A study based on field and laboratory data
- Reporting behavior: a literature review of experimental studies
- How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation
Uses Software
This page was built for publication: The influence of face-to-face communication: a principal-agent experiment
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q301155)