How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0855MaRDI QIDQ700104zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kathleen Valley, Leigh Thompson, Max H. Bazerman, Robert D. Gibbons

Publication date 30 September 2002

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7cf4a263353bc2680e6c18ef67daf382aec048a9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• How naiveté improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication
• Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
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• Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case

Cites work

• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study

Cited in

(12)

• Bilateral trading with naive traders
• Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
• Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis
• Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach
• The influence of face-to-face communication: a principal-agent experiment
• How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation
• Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
• How naiveté improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication
• The efficiency of real-world bargaining: evidence from wholesale used-auto auctions
• Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
• Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
• Resolving crises through automated bilateral negotiations

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