Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.011zbMath1250.91052OpenAlexW2030074922MaRDI QIDQ2276546

Ron Lavi, Sigal Oren

Publication date: 6 November 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.011

zbMATH Keywords

signalingex-post efficiencysimultaneous ascending auctionsmyopic bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• The package assignment model.
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• Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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