Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.10.012MaRDI QIDQ972880zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan

Publication date 21 May 2010

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.012

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscombinatorial auctionsascending auctionspackage auctionsnon-linear pricespersonalized prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 477584 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2072558 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• On the Stability of the Competitive Equilibrium, II
• On the computational power of demand queries
• Some Examples of Global Instability of the Competitive Equilibrium
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• The package assignment model.
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes

Cited in

(12)

• Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
• On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
• Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
• Combinatorial clock auctions: price direction and performance
• Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium
• Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
• Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
• Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
• Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
• Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions

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