Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.012zbMath1245.91035OpenAlexW1991758835MaRDI QIDQ972880

Noam Nisan, Liad Blumrosen

Publication date: 21 May 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.012

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsascending auctionspersonalized pricescombinatorial auctionspackage auctionsnon-linear prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium ⋮ Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms ⋮ Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction ⋮ Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case ⋮ Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions ⋮ Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions

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