Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.10.012zbMATH Open1245.91035OpenAlexW1991758835MaRDI QIDQ972880FDOQ972880

Noam Nisan, Liad Blumrosen

Publication date: 21 May 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.012

Recommendations

• An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
• Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
• Combinatorial clock auctions: price direction and performance

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscombinatorial auctionsascending auctionspackage auctionsnon-linear pricespersonalized prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• On the Stability of the Competitive Equilibrium, II
• Some Examples of Global Instability of the Competitive Equilibrium
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The package assignment model.
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• On the Computational Power of Demand Queries
• A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (10)

• Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
• Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
• Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
• Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
• Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
• Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
• Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
• Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions

This page was built for publication: Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q972880)