On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.02.005MaRDI QIDQ423778zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Laurent Lamy

Publication date 4 June 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.005

zbMATH Keywords

ascending auctionsbidder-optimal competitive equilibriumcombinatorial auctionscore-selecting auctionsVickrey payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
• Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions

Cites work

• Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
• An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• Combinatorial auction design
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• The package assignment model.

Cited in

(5)

• An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
• An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

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