Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1287/OPRE.1110.1024MaRDI QIDQ4648256zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert Day, Peter Cramton

Publication date 8 November 2012

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2005-2009/day-cramton-core-payments-for-combinatorial-auctions.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

group decisionsgamesauctionsbidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Quadratic programming (90C20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(18)

• Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
• Core pricing in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: computational hardness and algorithmic solutions
• On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions
• Non-monetary coordination mechanisms for time slot allocation in warehouse delivery
• On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
• Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis
• Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
• Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges
• An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
• The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
• An iterative combinatorial auction design for fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles
• Solving the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions for fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles
• The impact of core constraints on truthful bidding in combinatorial auctions
• Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
• Core deviation minimizing auctions
• On optimal bidding and inventory control in sequential procurement auctions: the multi period case
• Understanding the relationship between core constraints and core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions
• Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

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