Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.020zbMath1400.91226OpenAlexW2766518370WikidataQ57935156 ScholiaQ57935156MaRDI QIDQ1651267

Luke Lindsay

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10871/30141

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsShapley valuepackage biddingbalanced budgetexchanges

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value

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