Core-selecting package auctions

DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0100-7MaRDI QIDQ2482666zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 23 April 2008

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial biddingcore-selecting auctionsincentivesmenu auctionspackage biddingproxy auctionstruncation strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Fair payments for efficient allocations in public sector combinatorial auctions
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies

Cited in

(50)

• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
• Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges
• A pricing scheme for combinatorial auctions based on bundle sizes
• A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
• Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis
• Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties
• Quantile stable mechanisms
• A market-based approach for enabling inter-area reserve exchange
• Blind portfolios' auctions in two-rounds
• Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
• Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
• Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
• An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
• Core deviation minimizing auctions
• Can core allocations be achieved in avoidable fixed cost environments using two-part price competition?
• Diffusion auction design
• Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
• Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
• A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
• Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions
• Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
• First price package auction with many traders
• Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions
• Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
• An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions
• Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
• Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
• Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 970024 (Why is no real title available?)
• Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters
• The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
• The impact of core constraints on truthful bidding in combinatorial auctions
• Understanding the relationship between core constraints and core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions
• Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems
• Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching
• Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money
• An efficient and incentive-compatible dynamic multi-item auction under budget constraints
• Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market
• Optimal auctions through deep learning: advances in differentiable economics
• Reallocative auctions and core selection
• The VCG mechanism, the core, and assignment stages in auctions
• Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
• On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions
• On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions

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