Reallocative auctions and core selection

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAF065MaRDI QIDQ7255426zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Marzena Rostek, Nathan Yoder

Publication date 29 May 2026

Published in The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/RESTUD/RDAF065

zbMATH Keywords

core-selecting designmarket design for natural resourcesreallocative auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929535 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inverse M-matrices
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• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions
• Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
• Targeting Interventions in Networks
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• The package assignment model.
• Understanding preferences: ``demand types, and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes

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