Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
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Publication:1001822
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.002zbMath1154.91416OpenAlexW1973520166WikidataQ56481636 ScholiaQ56481636MaRDI QIDQ1001822
Bruno Strulovici, Paul R. Milgrom
Publication date: 19 February 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.002
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Related Items (13)
When Walras meets Vickrey ⋮ Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature ⋮ Identifying combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand ⋮ A single factor approximation ratio algorithm for DR-submodular maximization on integer lattice beyond non-negativity and monotonicity ⋮ Strong substitutes: structural properties, and a new algorithm for competitive equilibrium prices ⋮ Characterization and algorithm for bivariate multi-unit assignment valuations ⋮ Lone wolves in competitive equilibria ⋮ Gross substitutes and complements: a simple generalization ⋮ On the expressiveness of assignment messages ⋮ First price package auction with many traders ⋮ Time bounds for iterative auctions: a unified approach by discrete convex analysis ⋮ A fast double greedy algorithm for non-monotone DR-submodular function maximization ⋮ Core Pricing in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers: Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions
Cites Work
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- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- Indefinite knowledge about an object and accuracy of its recovery methods
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Combinatorial optimization. Theory and algorithms
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