On the expressiveness of assignment messages

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.110051MaRDI QIDQ2236244zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maximilian Fichtl

Publication date 22 October 2021

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.05051

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsassignment messagesmin-cost flowsstrong substitutes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Abstract: In this note we prove that the class of valuation functions representable via integral assignment messages is a proper subset of strong substitutes valuations. Thus, there are strong substitutes valuations not expressible via assignment messages.

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Cites work

• Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuations
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Network flows. Theory, algorithms, and applications.
• Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
• Understanding preferences: ``demand types, and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities

Cited in

(3)

• On the composition of Tunstall messages
• Characterization and algorithm for bivariate multi-unit assignment valuations
• Strong substitutes: structural properties, and a new algorithm for competitive equilibrium prices

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