First price package auction with many traders

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.001zbMath1395.91239OpenAlexW3122543492MaRDI QIDQ516057

Yasuhiro Shirata

Publication date: 20 March 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10252/5134

zbMATH Keywords

bidder optimal corepackage auctionVCG outcomeWalrasian pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Internet auctions with many traders
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
• The package assignment model.
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Common Agency
• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
• Games Played Through Agents
• The Core of an N Person Game

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