Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.09.004zbMATH Open1142.91492OpenAlexW2129885111MaRDI QIDQ869869FDOQ869869
Authors: Debasis Mishra, David C. Parkes 
Publication date: 9 March 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3996850
Recommendations
primal-dual algorithmcombinatorial auctionsVickrey auctionsmulti-item auctionsuniversal competitive equilibrium
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47)
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Cited In (37)
- Connected price dynamics with revealed preferences and Auctioneer's discretion in VCG combinatorial auction
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- Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
- Combinatorial auctions
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- Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets
- Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
- On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
- A study of auction mechanisms for multilateral procurement based on subgradient and bundle methods
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
- An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
- Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
- Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
- Sustainable decision model for liner shipping industry
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- Dynamic communication mechanism design
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- Auction design with costly preference elicitation
- Iterative Auction Design for Tree Valuations
- Statistical modeling of Vickrey auctions and applications to automated bidding strategies
- Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
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