Auction design with costly preference elicitation
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Publication:812389
DOI10.1007/s10472-005-4692-yzbMath1123.91318MaRDI QIDQ812389
Publication date: 23 January 2006
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-005-4692-y
proxy agents; preference elicitation; computational mechanism design; incremental revelation principle; meta-deliberation
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
The private value single item bisection auction, Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items, Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations, Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA, Combinatorial auctions for electronic business, Computational complexity of some intelligent computing systems
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