Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00184-2zbMath1077.91023MaRDI QIDQ1885427

Noa Kfir-Dahav, Ron Holzman, Moshe Tennenholtz, Dov Monderer

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (25)

Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations ⋮ Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions ⋮ Mediators in position auctions ⋮ A simple and fast algorithm for convex decomposition in relax-and-round mechanisms ⋮ Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium ⋮ Setting lower bounds on truthfulness ⋮ Undivide and Conquer: On Selling a Divisible and Homogeneous Good ⋮ Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the Vapnik--Chervonenkis Dimension ⋮ A survey of approximability and inapproximability results for social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation ⋮ On the value of using group discounts under price competition ⋮ Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions ⋮ Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms ⋮ Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions ⋮ Optimal Allocation in Combinatorial Auctions with Quadratic Utility Functions ⋮ Combinatorial auctions without money ⋮ Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets ⋮ Robust game theory ⋮ The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices ⋮ Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable ⋮ Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders ⋮ Learning equilibrium as a generalization of learning to optimize ⋮ Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach ⋮ Auction design with costly preference elicitation ⋮ Efficient learning equilibrium

Uses Software

• CABOB

Cites Work

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