Undivide and Conquer: On Selling a Divisible and Homogeneous Good

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2014-0002zbMath1375.91099OpenAlexW625618499MaRDI QIDQ4588467

Omer Levy, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2015.15.issue-1/bejte-2014-0002/bejte-2014-0002.xml?format=INT

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbundlingVCG

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
• Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
• Mixed bundling auctions
• Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Mechanism design with uncertain inputs

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