Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
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Publication:2454572
DOI10.1007/S00493-011-2528-4zbMATH Open1299.91048OpenAlexW2611688713MaRDI QIDQ2454572FDOQ2454572
Authors: Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan 
Publication date: 13 June 2014
Published in: Combinatorica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.208.7960
Recommendations
Analysis of algorithms (68W40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Combinatorial games (91A46)
Cites Work
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Cited In (12)
- Limitations of the upward separation technique
- Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
- Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
- Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions
- Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
- Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
- Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions
- Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
- Commodity auctions and frugality ratios
- Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding
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