Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
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Publication:2454572
DOI10.1007/s00493-011-2528-4zbMath1299.91048OpenAlexW2611688713MaRDI QIDQ2454572
Publication date: 13 June 2014
Published in: Combinatorica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.208.7960
Analysis of algorithms (68W40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Combinatorial games (91A46)
Related Items (5)
Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms ⋮ Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding ⋮ Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers ⋮ Unnamed Item
Cites Work
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