Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations
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Publication:3177762
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(12)- Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Separating the communication complexity of truthful and nontruthful algorithms for combinatorial auctions
- Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding
- Inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension
- Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
- An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
- Communication complexity of combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
- A generic truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions
- Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding
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