Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations
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Publication:3177762
DOI10.1145/2786754zbMATH Open1426.68119OpenAlexW2333413293MaRDI QIDQ3177762FDOQ3177762
Jan VondrΓ‘k, Shahar Dobzinski
Publication date: 2 August 2018
Published in: Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2786754
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cited In (5)
- Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding
- Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions
- Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding
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- An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations π π
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