Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.006zbMath1497.91136MaRDI QIDQ2155910

Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/73439/7/D%C3%BCtting_Best-response%20dynamics%20in%20combinatorial%20auctions%20with%20item%20bidding_published_2017%20LSERO1.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

best-response dynamics; algorithmic game theory; combinatorial auctions; item bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A86: Game theory and fuzziness

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