On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

DOI10.1137/1.9781611974331.ch97zbMath1417.91227arXiv1507.06495OpenAlexW2952493971MaRDI QIDQ4575680

Adrian Vetta, Christoph Hunkenschröder, Yang Cai, Nicolas Bousquet

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.06495

zbMATH Keywords

stopping ruleoptimal welfarecombinatorial clock auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction ⋮ Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding

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